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Using Creative Visual Research Methods to Understand Media 
Audiences 
 
This article introduces an emerging area of qualitative media ‹audience› 
research, in which individuals are asked to produce media or visual 
material themselves, as a way of exploring their relationship with particu-
lar issues or dimensions of media. The process of making a creative visual 
artefact – as well as the artefact itself (which may be, for example, a video, 
drawing, collage, or imagined magazine cover) – offers a reflective entry-
point into an exploration of individuals» relationships with media culture. 
This article sets out some of the origins, rationale and philosophy 
underlying this methodological approach; briefly discusses two example 
studies (one in which children made videos to consider their relationship 
with the environment, and one in which young people drew pictures of 
celebrities as part of an examination of their aspirations and identifications 
with stars); and finally considers some emerging issues for further 
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Introduction 
Research into the impact of mass media on its audiences can be 
simplistically grouped into two traditional strands. One strand has used a 
range of methods in a bid to ‹set up› individuals so that the researchers can 
point to some aspect of their behaviour or response which can be 
represented as a media ‹effect›. The other strand has sought to avoid this 
crude and patronising approach, by speaking to individuals about their 
media consumption instead. Both approaches are somewhat unsatisfactory, 
since they rely on interpretations of instant responses rather than more 
reflective self-expressions, and they fail to give individuals the opportunity 
to express themselves creatively, or to significantly affect the research 
agenda. 
This article discusses a new approach to qualitative audience research, 
based around methods in which participants are asked to create media or 
artistic artefacts themselves. The process of making a creative visual 
artefact – as well as the artefact itself (which may be, for example, a video, 
drawing, collage, or imagined magazine cover) – offers a different way into 
an exploration of individuals› relationships with media culture.  
The Centre for Creative Media Research at Bournemouth Media School, 
UK, has been established to provide a hub for work in this emerging area 
(built in particular around the ArtLab website [www.artlab.org.uk], events 
such as the Symposium at Tate Britain in London which we organised in 
May 2004 [www.artlab.org.uk/tate.htm], and the forthcoming book The 
New Creative Audience Studies). This article aims: 
– to set out some of the origins, rationale and philosophy underlying this 
methodological approach; 
– to briefly discuss two example studies; 
– and to consider some emerging elements for further development of this 
method. 
 
It is commonplace in media studies to observe that (in developed, Western 
societies at least) we live in a world where individuals are bombarded with 
a large quantity and range of images and messages from television, radio, 
print, the internet, other forms of media, and the advertising and corporate 
material that surrounds us. This material, as well as being very ubiquitous, 
is also usually very visual, or a complex mix of audio and visual material. 
It is also commonplace in media studies, however, to explore the question 
of people’s responses to this material through language alone: using 
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methods such as interviews or focus groups, researchers typically expect 
media consumers to provide more-or-less instant accounts, in words, of 
their feelings about these complex visual or audio-visual experiences. 
There is little reason to think that this would be an easy or straightforward 
task for most people. It is difficult to generate, on demand, a verbal account 
of a complex audio-visual experience1. 
Therefore, the approaches which this paper proposes offer a different way 
into these issues. By operating on the visual plane, these visual/creative 
methods mirror the visual nature of much contemporary media – so that 
there is a ‹match› between the research process which operates (or at least 
begins) on the visual plane, and the research area – people’s relationship 
with contemporary culture – which also operates (or at least begins) on the 
visual plane. 
When participants are asked to make a creative artefact, this brings about a 
considerable change in the pace of statement-generation within the research 
process. Language-based methods are relatively time-pressured: if I ask 
you a question, it would seem strange if you didn’t begin to provide me 
with an answer within a few seconds. Creative tasks, on the other hand, are 
understood to take longer, and lead to a more reflective process, where it 
seems ‹natural› to take time to think about what is to be produced, and how 
this can be achieved; and furthermore, during the time it takes to make the 
work, the participant will have spent further time – creative time – thinking 
about the research issue and their response to it, so that by the end of the 
process, even if we do ultimately resort to language, they will have 
developed a set of responses which may be quite different to what their 
initial ‹gut reaction› may have been. (This approach is not necessarily 
‹better›: asking people to verbally provide their spontaneous reactions to 
certain research questions can be valuable in certain circumstances, but by 
definition such responses will not be the most reflective or carefully 
considered). Moreover, the physical process of making something – 
drawing, for example – involves the body in a physical engagement with 
thought which, again, may affect personal response: some artists would 
suggest, for instance, that the physical effort of making a creative piece 
means that the engagement with it begins in the mind but comes through 
                                         
1  There is not space here to add to the extensive previous discussions of the limitations 
of the established approaches (but see, for example, Moores, 1993; Ang, 1996; 
Gauntlett & Hill, 1999; Ruddock, 2001). This article is instead an attempt to begin a 
consideration of alternative and complementary methods. 
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the body, and that this bodily engagement is a significant part of the 
thinking-through of the piece (see, for example, Kuh, 2000, and Palmer, 
2004). 
This approach recognizes the creativity of audiences. It is obviously quite 
different to those studies (which, indeed, it was developed in opposition to 
– see Gauntlett, 1995, 1997, 2001) which offer participants a limited range 
of possible ways to express their response. Such response-limited studies 
include, for example, surveys where respondents have to concur with one 
of a pre-set range of views, or ‹effects› studies where the ‹subjects› have 
their behaviour categorised, within a pre-set range, by observers. By 
contrast, participants in visual/creative studies can offer a wide range of 
responses, and ideally should be able to significantly change the re-
searchers’ agenda or frames of reference. (Of course, as with any kind of 
research, such studies can be done badly, or unimaginatively, or used in a 
way which ultimately categorises participants in limited ways; but that 
should not be the intention). 
Furthermore, it is contended that setting a task which invites participants to 
engage in a visual creative activity (making a media or artistic artefact) – as 
opposed to a language activity (the traditional spoken or written response) 
– leads to the brain being used in a different way. A full understanding of 
neuroscience is not necessary for this point to be made. Recent introduc-
tions to the latest scientific findings regarding the human brain and how it 
works, such as Winston (2003) and Greenfield (2000), reflect that even 
specialist scientists themselves do not have a clear understanding of how 
the brain works. However it is clear that earlier ‹modular› models (which 
suggested one corner of the brain dealt exclusively with language, for 
example, and another dealt wholly with movement) were not quite right, as 
different areas of the brain appear to work together. Nevertheless, different 
brain patterns, and different area networks, are associated with different 
types of activity, and so visual/creative studies will use some parts of the 
brain, and some kinds of brain activity, which are different to studies which 
ask participants to generate language/speech. Combined with the more 
reflective process, this could – possibly, at least – lead to a different quality 
of data. 
Finally, this kind of approach tends not to treat people as ‹audience› of 
particular things. A standard approach in media studies is to see people as 
the ‹audience› of a particular individual media product – a particular soap 
opera, or a particular magazine, for example. This kind of approach, by 
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contrast, prefers to recognise that most individuals are typically surrounded 
by a very broad range of media which they engage with on various levels, 
and involving different dimensions of pleasure, intellectual connection, 
distaste, voyeurism, apathy, enthusiasm, desire, and other feelings. It seems 
best, then, not to single out specific branded ‹bits› of the media for 
examination, but rather to look at the impact of different broader elements, 
spheres, or styles.  
 
Making visual things 
We know that humans have been engaged in artistic expression for a very 
long time. The drawings in the Chauvet-Pont-d’Arc cave in southern 
France, for example, have been found to be at least 31,000 years old 
(Lewis-Williams, 2002; Clottes & Féruglio, 2004). To get back to this 
period in a hypothetical time machine, you would have to travel back to the 
fall of the Roman Empire, and then travel a further twenty times as far back 
into history. It is worth pausing to consider this long-standing human 
interest in the creation of imagery. 
Friedrich Nietzsche suggested that human beings, since ancient times, have 
felt the need to make marks to represent their lives and experiences not 
simply as a reflection of private dreams, or to communicate instrumental 
facts about survival, but as a kind of necessary celebration of existence: an 
«impulse which calls art into being, as the complement and consummation 
of existence, seducing one to a continuation of life» ([1872] 1967: 43). We 
can see that this principle could apply to any number of creative works 
from any period – linking, say, a Chauvet cave sketch of running horses, 
with a Vermeer painting of a woman reading a letter, with a Hollywood 
romantic comedy. 
For many centuries the purpose of art was generally seen as being the 
attempt to reflect the beauty of nature – stemming back to Aristotle’s 
notion (c. 384–322 BC) that the purpose of art should be the imitation of 
nature (mimesis). This was meant in a broad sense – art simply had to offer, 
as Richard Eldridge puts it, the «presentation of a subject matter as a focus 
for thought, fused to perceptual experience of the work» (2003: 29). Art did 
not have to be a simple ‹copy› of what we see in the world, then; music, for 
example, fitted very well into this definition of imitation. Furthermore, in 
Poetics, Aristotle argued that art arises because «representation is natural to 
human beings from childhood», and because «everyone delights in 
representations» and we like to learn from them (2004: 4). He also stated 
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that the function of art is «not to relate things that have happened, but 
things that may happen, i.e. that are possible in accordance with probability 
or necessity» (p. 12), thereby suggesting that art is about possibilities, and 
perhaps a thinking-through of ideas about ways of living.  
These ideas about art, then, were often complex and sophisticated, but did 
not place special emphasis on the psychology of the artist themselves. The 
Romantic era, from the second half of the 18th century, embraced the idea 
that art was primarily the self-expression of the artist (feelings, emotion 
and experience). The groundwork had been laid by George Berkeley, who 
in An Essay Towards A New Theory of Vision (1709) established the idea 
that we can only have mental representations of things, and not fully 
‹know› a thing in itself. An artwork, then, could not be about the world, but 
about a person’s experience of the world – giving much useful fuel to 
Romantic critics who were happy to celebrate artistic expression, and the 
mind’s creative power, as superior to the ‹accurate› but unfermented view 
of the world produced by a camera obscura. 
«In the light of this», as Julian Bell explains, «eighteenth-century artistic 
theory turned from how the painting related to the world towards how the 
painting related to the painter» (1999: 56). The artist David Hockney, 
whose work includes a range of experiments with representation – in 
particular rejecting the conventional Western approach to perspective – 
says that artistic depiction «is not an attempt to re-create something, but an 
account of seeing it». Hockney cites Cézanne as a painter who made this 
especially apparent: «He wasn’t concerned with apples, but with his 
perception of apples. That’s clear from his work» (Hockney & Joyce, 2002: 
58). A similar point is made by Arthur C. Danto in The Transfiguration of 
the Commonplace (1981): «It is as if a work of art were like an 
externalisation of the artist’s consciousness, as if we could see his way of 
seeing and not merely what he saw» (p. 164). 
In an attempt to provide an even broader account of creative production, 
Richard Eldridge suggests that the motive of all creators and artists is «To 
express, and in expressing to clarify, inner emotions and attitudes – their 
own and others» – in relation to the common materials of outer life» 
(2003:100). This useful phrase highlights the working-through of feelings 
and ideas, and the way in which creative activity is itself where the 
thinking-through and the self-expression takes place, as well as being a 
process which creates an artefact which represents the outcome of those 
thinking and feeling processes. 
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Indeed, many key thinkers on the meaning of art have similarly seen artistic 
making as an act which reflects, and works through, human experience. In 
his Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, originally delivered in the 1820s, 
Hegel describes the making of artworks as a universal human need to 
consider one’s own existence:  
The universal and absolute need out of which art, on its formal side, 
arises has its source in the fact that man is a thinking consciousness, 
i.e. that he draws out of himself, and makes explicit for himself, that 
which he is… The things of nature are only immediate and single, but 
man as mind reduplicates himself, inasmuch as prima facie he is like 
the things of nature, but in the second place just as really is for 
himself, perceives himself, has ideas of himself, thinks himself, and 
only thus is active self-realizedness (2004: 35). 
Making ‹external things› upon which a person inevitably ‹impresses the 
seal of his inner being› gives that person the opportunity to reflect upon 
their selfhood; ‹the inner and outer world› is projected into ‹an object in 
which he recognises his own self› (p. 36). Hegel’s implication that 
something made by a person will necessarily express something about its 
creator interestingly predates Freud’s suggestion, which would emerge 
almost 100 years later and in a quite different tradition, that artworks – 
along with dreams, slips of the tongue, and any other product of the brain – 
will reflect aspects of conscious or unconscious personality. 
Novelist Leo Tolstoy also felt that art communicated selfhood, but his 
model anticipates more deliberate action. In 1896, he wrote: «Art is a 
human activity [in which] one man consciously by means of certain signs, 
hands onto others feelings he has lived through, and that others are infected 
by those feelings and also experience them» (1960: 51). Although 
Tolstoy’s transmission model – where feelings are implanted into a work 
by its creator and then ‹infect› its audiences – seems rather simplistic, his 
point is that art should primarily be about the communication of genuinely 
felt emotions. On this basis, he rejected numerous highly-regarded works 
of art, including many of his own, as decadent and ‹counterfeit›, because 
they were based on spectacle and an attempt to capture beauty or sentiment, 
rather than stemming from truly-felt emotions. Only works with this 
authentic base in feeling (whatever its character – joy or despair, love or 
hate) would be able to evoke a matching experience of such feelings in the 
audience. 
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In the twentieth century, John Dewey, in Art as Experience ([1934] 1980), 
argued that looking at artworks – or at least, particular works of art that are 
meaningful to us – ‹elicits and accentuates› the experience of wholeness 
and connection with the wider universe beyond ourselves (p. 195). Dewey 
does not mean famous ‹masterpieces› in particular (although those are 
likely to have become celebrated because of these properties, at least in 
part); for Dewey, art is part of everyday experience. «The understanding of 
art and of its role in civilization is not furthered by setting out with eulogies 
of it nor by occupying ourselves exclusively at the outset with great works 
of art recognized as such» (p. 10). Dewey suggests that understanding an 
artistic experience is like understanding how a flower grows – rather than 
simply noticing that it is pretty – and therefore involves an understanding 
of ‹the soil, air, and light» which have contributed to the aetiology of the 
work and which will be reflected in it (p. 12). This means that, just as we 
associate a botanist with the study of flowers, we could expect to associate 
a sociologist with the exploration of artworks. 
Dewey suggests that art can introduce us «into a world beyond this world 
which is nevertheless the deeper reality of the world in which we live in 
our ordinary experiences». This may sound quasi-religious, but Dewey’s 
concerns are pragmatic: «I can see no psychological ground for such 
properties of an experience, save that, somehow, the work of art operates to 
deepen and to raise to great clarity that sense of an enveloping undefined 
whole that accompanies every normal experience». This brings «a 
peculiarly satisfying sense of unity in itself and with ourselves» (p. 195). 
Therefore, simply put, making or looking at a work of art encourages 
reflection upon ourselves and our place in the world. 
These theories all suggest, albeit with different emphases and nuances, that 
creativity and artistic production is driven by a desire to communicate 
feelings and ideas; and that such works will almost inevitably tell us 
something about their creator. In particular, artistic works are a thinking-
through and reflection of social and psychological experience. 
 
Interpreting visual material produced by research participants 
When creative or artistic works are produced not as an exercise in 
‹spontaneous› self-expression, but rather because a researcher has 
requested that they be made, questions about the interpretation of such 
work seem especially poignant. In studies where participants have been 
asked to produce material such as a drawing, collage, photographs or a 
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video, the problem of how this imagery can be used in a way which does 
not rely too much on the researcher’s own subjective interpretation can 
seem to be a serious hurdle. 
One response to this dilemma is to observe that researchers always have a 
job of interpretation to do; whether their data is a set of images, or a set of 
verbal statements generated in an interview or focus group, the researcher 
can only do their best to interpret this material. By reminding us that the 
meanings of language-based data are far from self-evident or self-
explanatory, this point – which I have made myself in the past – is useful. 
However, it ducks the main problem: frankly, if we are looking at visual 
material in the hope of ascertaining how the artist/producer feels about 
something, this is more difficult than if we are faced with a verbal 
statement where a person says how they feel about something. Interpreting 
the latter is not necessarily straightforward either, but the researcher has 
something clear, intentional, and verifiable, to go on. 
An example will make this obvious point even more clear. Compare two 
pieces of data provided by a participant called Sarah: 
– Item A: A drawing of Tony Blair, where he appears to be frowning, and 
pointing. 
– Item B: The verbal statement «I think Tony Blair is terrible, he’s very 
arrogant and he’s doing a bad job». 
 
If we only had Item B to analyse, we would not feel uncomfortable 
asserting that Sarah believes that Tony Blair is ‹terrible›, ‹very arrogant› 
and ‹doing a bad job›, because she has said so in those very words and we 
have little reason to think she is being untruthful. Furthermore, the meaning 
of these words is widely understood, and so we could go beyond quoting 
those particular words and generate other adjectives which we could also 
be confident about: it would be OK to say, for example, that Sarah is 
disappointed by Blair’s performance; she feels he is too single-minded and 
is failing to listen to others. 
If, on the other hand, we only had Item A to analyse, we could be much 
less certain. Perhaps the drawing shows that Sarah finds Blair disagreeable, 
as seen in his dictatorial pointing and in the frown with which he dismisses 
other people’s views; or perhaps she feels that Blair, a decisive leader, 
deals assertively with each day’s challenges. Or something else. 
In an attempt to find or develop a methodology of interpretation, I studied a 
lot of texts from the field of art therapy, since art therapists have for 
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decades been eliciting artworks from patients in a bid to understand them 
better (for example, Betensky, 1973; Di Leo, 1973, 1983; Klepsch & 
Logie, 1982; Koppitz, 1984; Malchiodi, 1998a, 1998b; Matthews, 1998; 
Oster & Montgomery, 1996; Silver, 2001; Thomas & Silk, 1990). Of 
course, art therapy is a diverse field with different approaches and practi-
ces. Some have always used the art as a loose kind of starting-point for 
therapeutic explorations. Some believe that the psychoanalytic approach to 
reading dreams (first outlined in Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams, 
1900), in which images are read as metaphors, can be applied to children’s 
artworks (Diem-Wille, 2001, and Furth, 2002, are recent exponents of this 
approach). Another body of art therapists, for much of the twentieth 
century, had sought to use art as a direct diagnostic tool. Specific tests were 
developed, such as the ‹House–Tree–Person› test (Buck, 1948, 1964) – 
where the patient would be asked to draw a house, a tree and a person, and 
then the clinician would use diagnostic charts to ‹identify› psychological 
problems based on aspects of the drawings. Unsurprisingly, in the past two 
or three decades this seemingly deterministic and simplistic kind of 
approach came to be less popular (Thomas & Silk, 1990; Malchiodi, 
1998b). Today, it is more common for art therapists to encourage their 
clients to produce drawings (or other artwork), but then talk with them 
about the artwork. Instead of the therapist interpreting the image, the 
person themselves interprets their work – which makes much more sense.  
In the traditional approach, the ‹expert› would impose their interpretation 
of the work. Such an imposition is a methodological problem and also, in 
therapeutic terms, devalues the knowledge and experience of the client. As 
art therapist Cathy Malchiodi writes: 
In my own work with children’s drawings from a phenomenological 
approach, the first step involves taking a stance of ‹not knowing›. This 
is similar to the philosophy described by social constructivist theorists 
who see the therapist’s role in work with people as one of co-creator, 
rather than expert advisor. By seeing the client as the expert on his or 
her own experiences, an openness to new information and discoveries 
naturally evolves for the therapist. Although art expressions may share 
some commonalities in form, content, and style, taking a stance of not 
knowing allows the child’s experiences of creating and making art 
expressions to be respected as individual and to have a variety of 
meanings (1998b: 36). 
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From recent developments in art therapy, then, I learnt the answer to the 
problem of how you interpret an artistic or creative work: you get the artist 
to interpret it themselves. Therefore, to return to the above example, we 
would ask Sarah to do a drawing of Tony Blair and then, after she has spent 
perhaps 10 minutes thinking and 30 minutes drawing, we would discuss 
different dimensions of the drawing with her, asking what different 
suggestive parts of it might mean, which would probably stimulate a 
focused and thoughtful discussion of her feelings about the politician. 
 
Why bother with words at all?:  
The place of language in visual culture 
Can we simply do away with words altogether? It seems not. Almost all 
formal academic communication takes place in language, and for good 
reasons: our clearest thoughts take the form of language, even when they 
are ‹only› in the mind and have not been expressed. In his book Visual 
Thinking, Rudolph Arnheim (1969) argues that thought operates primarily 
on the visual plane: 
Purely verbal thinking [without reference to non-language impressions 
and images] is the prototype of thoughtless thinking, the automatic 
recourse to connections retrieved from storage. It is useful but sterile. 
What makes language so valuable for thinking, then, cannot be 
thinking in words. It must be the help that words lend to thinking 
while it operates in a more appropriate medium, such as visual 
imagery (p. 231-232). 
Arnheim argues that the kind of thinking which can be done in words 
alone – the logical form of thinking that computers can imitate – is 
fine but very limited. He suggests that humans routinely form 
thoughts and make judgements based on perceptions, impressions, 
feelings, and visual material which cannot be reduced to words – 
which are beyond words. Arnheim admits that language can then be 
helpful, bringing order: «It supplies a clear-cut, distinct sign for each 
type and thereby encourages perceptual imagery to stabilise the 
inventory of visual concepts» (p. 236). This idea of language bringing 
stability to the visual is fruitful. Arnheim himself, with his own 
mission to promote the visual as being at the heart of thinking, is not 
so impressed: «The function of language is essentially conservative 
and stabilising, and therefore it also tends, negatively, to make 
cognition static and immobile», he notes (p. 244). 
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Nevertheless, language helps enormously with reliable communication. We 
can readily propose ways in which images alone can ‹communicate›, of 
course, and it is easy to assert that images can express ‹so much more› than 
language. Such a view is always nice, and often true. But it is interesting to 
note what happens in Julian Bell’s excellent book What is Painting? 
(1999), when, after many pages of writing about painting as the expression 
of ideas and emotions, he seems to get fed up with it all, suddenly 
shattering the prior assumptions of his own text with this passage: 
But let us be brutal: expression is a joke. Your painting expresses – for 
you; but it does not communicate to me. You had something in mind, 
something you wanted to ‹bring out›; but looking at what you have 
done, I have no certainty that I know what it was. Your colours do not 
say anything to me in particular; they are stuff to look at, but looking 
is not the same as catching meanings… [A work] has ‹meaning›, 
insofar as we open our eyes to it and allow them to wander and gaze 
in fascination; but that ‹meaning› is not an idea or an emotion, not a 
specific, unequivocal message. What we see is what we get: a product, 
not a process, lies on the wall. 
But we are not happy to accept this. We yearn for expression to be 
communication, for every wandering mark to find its home. As a 
result, alongside this two-centuries-old growth of the painting of 
personal expression, a massive institution of explanation has grown up 
to control and stabilise the market» (p. 170)2. 
It is interesting to note that Bell, like Arnheim, says that words are 
deployed to ‹stabilise› the meaning of images. In terms of academic 
research, or more specifically research about the ways in which individuals 
relate to media material, it would be difficult to ditch words altogether. 
 
The feminist critique of traditional research methods 
It should also be mentioned that the methodological approach proposed in 
this paper has been influenced by the feminist critique of traditional 
                                         
2  Bell admits that his own book is part of that industry of writing words about pictures. 
«But the book is trying to point the way through the institution’s dim interior, towards 
the exit. To steer a path through the maze of words, towards the complex, but largely 
wordless pleasures of looking – that is the broad intention of this text, because it 
comes from a painter, someone committed to producing objects specifically for 
viewing» (1999: 171). 
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research (see for example Roberts, 1990; Reinharz, 1992; Hesse-Biber & 
Yaiser, 2003; Letherby, 2003). This is not simply in the sense of preferring 
qualitative to quantitative methods; and, in terms of its impact here, has 
little to do with gender issues. Rather, we note that feminists have criticised 
both qualitative and quantitative researchers for their tendency to use 
participants as mere suppliers of data. Traditionally, a researcher merely 
encounters ‹subjects› and takes ‹data› away, without giving anything back 
to the people involved. Participants are not involved in the process, are not 
consulted about the style or content of the process – apart from in the 
moment(s) in which they supply data – and do not usually get an 
opportunity to shape the agenda of the research. The process usually 
involves little real interaction, or dialogue. The creative/visual methods do 
not inherently or necessarily avoid this, but they provide more 
opportunities for participants to shape the content of the enquiry, to bring in 
issues and questions which the researcher may not have considered, and to 
express themselves outside of boundaries set by the researcher. (It is in the 
area of interpretation and analysis, as noted above, where the researcher 
regains the power to diminish and misunderstand the contribution of the 
participants; this is why the participants should be enabled to set the agenda 
here too, interpreting their own work rather than having an interpretation 
imposed upon them).  
 
History of the approach 
Unsurprisingly, the idea of asking people to produce visual material within 
research is not new (although it seems that using it in media audience 
research, as outlined in this paper, is quite new). The book Image-Based 
Research, edited by Jon Prosser (1998), offers a range of interesting 
chapters on the growth of visually-oriented methods in social research. 
Many of them are about sociological uses of photography. Douglas 
Harper’s «An Argument for Visual Sociology» (1998) is a good 
introduction to visual sociology, but much of it is about (documentary) 
photography – photographic records of life – rather than using image-
creation within a new research process. Similarly, Prosser & Schwartz 
(1998) discuss whether photographs can be trusted as authentic 
representations of social life. (Of course, such questions are not significant 
if we are discussing visual material which is seen as a record of self-
expression, rather than as a record of exterior realities). 
Art and drawings are considered in some chapters of Image-Based 
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Research, though, most notably in the chapter by Noreen M. Whetton & 
Jennifer McWhirter. Back in 1972, Whetton developed the ‹Draw and 
Write Technique», as part of a project which established that although 
children aged 7–8 may not be able to communicate certain emotions 
through words (whether written or spoken), they could feel them and 
understand them in others. This was revealed through the children’s 
drawings, and their subsequent faltering speech about the emotions 
depicted in the drawings: 
It became apparent that the children experienced and empathized with 
a wide range of emotions including anger, frustration, despair, 
remorse, guilt, embarrassment and relief as well as delight, enjoyment, 
excitement. The children differed only from adults in that they did not 
have the vocabulary to express themselves» (Whetton & McWhirter, 
1998: 273). 
Since then, Whetton, with colleagues, has used children’s drawings to 
explore various aspects of their world, such as a study looking at how they 
drew a story involving drug dealers (Williams, Whetton and Moon, 1989a), 
a study exploring how children picture the insides of their bodies 
(Williams, Whetton and Moon, 1989b), and a study revealing children’s 
interpretations of dental health campaigns (Whetton & McWhirter, 1998). 
In media audience research which did use some visual material and asked 
participants to do a creative (writing) task, members of the Glasgow Media 
Group asked participants to write their own news headlines or reports to 
accompany actual news photographs or headlines which they were given, 
or sometimes asked to write scripts to accompany other material (see for 
example Kitzinger, 1990, 1993; Philo, 1990, 1996; Miller, 1994). These 
studies aimed to show how the public have been influenced by (or, at least, 
have remembered the discourses of) media coverage of particular topics. 
More recently, new media researchers have looked at websites produced by 
fans, activists, and other ‹ordinary people› using the internet to express 
themselves, exploring these as a kind of unsolicited data, non-mainstream 
visual and textual constructions which can tell us something about people’s 
relationship with mainstream media and mainstream politics (see, for 
example, chapters in Gauntlett & Horsley, eds, 2004).  
And I have recently, belatedly, become aware of the work of Horst Niesyto 
and his colleagues at the University of Ludwigsburg, Germany. Niesyto has 
been working on the idea of using visual and audio-visual productions 
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within qualitative research since the 1980s, mostly in German and in 
German-language publications (with English-language articles appearing 
since the late 1990s). His thoughtful discussions (such as «Youth Research 
on Video Self-productions: Reflections on a Social-aesthetic Approach», 
2000) focus on the ways in which media materials are thoroughly 
integrated into the everyday experiences of young people, and are part of 
their construction of their social worlds. The method developed by Niesyto 
since the mid-1980s – projects in which «young people had the chance to 
express personal images of experience in self-produced video films» (p. 
137) – is based on a philosophy which has much in common with that 
which I thought I had been originating (!), separately, since the mid-1990s. 
Niesyto writes: 
In view of media’s increasing influence on everyday communication, I 
put forward the following thesis: If somebody – in nowadays media 
society – wants to learn something about youth’s ideas, feelings, and 
their ways of experiencing the world, he or she should give them a 
chance to express themselves also by means of their own self-made 
media products! (p. 137). 
More recently the methods have become more complex3; see, for example, 
the article by Peter Holzwarth & Björn Maurer (2003) which details the 
international collaborative project, Children in Communication about 
Migration (known as CHICAM – see www.chicam.net), in which young 
people used collage (with cut-up magazines), disposable cameras, various 
videoed activities, arrangements of photographs with music, and specific 
photo tasks (such as a photo essay on likes and dislikes, or on national 
symbols), as well as video productions, which were shared and discussed 
internationally via the internet. Holzwarth & Maurer suggest: 
In an era when audio-visual media play an increasingly influential role 
                                         
3  In 2000 there was a conference in Germany, ‘Eigenproduktionen mit Medien als 
Gegenstand der Kindheits- und Jugendforschung’ [‘Self-productions with media as a 
subject of childhood and youth research’], in which German researchers presented 
several studies including video, graffiti, audio and computer-based media productions 
(see Niesyto, 2001). There was also the international project ‘VideoCulture’ (1997-
2000, coordinated by Horst Niesyto), which explored the potential of images and 
music in the context of intercultural communication (see Journal of Educational 
Media, Special Issue: The VideoCulture Project, Vol. 26, No. 3 (October 2001); 
Niesyto, 2003; www.ph-ludwigsburg.de/medien1/forsch). 
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in children’s and adolescent’s perceptions, it is important that re-
searchers not rely on verbal approaches alone, but also give young 
people the opportunity to express themselves in contemporary media 
forms. Audio-visual data should not be considered an alternative to 
verbal data but rather a source of data with a different quality» (p. 
127). 
They conclude that: 
Using their own media productions as communication links makes it 
easier for children to talk about their world and living environment 
[…] these works provide openings into the children’s world which 
language barriers would otherwise render inaccessible (p. 136). 
CHICAM is co-ordinated by David Buckingham, whose work on 
children’s media literacy in the 1990s was undoubtedly an influence upon 
this emerging sphere of work (for example, Buckingham & Sefton-Green, 
1994). Most recently, Buckingham & Bragg’s study of young people’s 
responses to media portrayals of sex and personal relationships (2004) gave 
teenage participants a blank notebook and asked them to keep a ‹diary› or 
‹scrapbook›, containing personal reflections upon such material seen in the 
media, with intriguing results. 
It is hoped that, as researchers become aware of the similarities between 
projects being developed in different countries, we can start to come 
together more, share ideas and collaborate. 
 
Examples of the method in action 
Our own examples of the visual/creative approach in action can be found at 
the website of the Centre for Creative Media Research, at ‹www.artlab. 
org.uk›. Some are more developed than others, ranging from a published 
book-length monograph to smaller pilot studies, as well as activities where 
the approach is used with an emphasis more on teaching, or art workshops, 
rather than for research. Here we will consider two examples of research 
projects, one involving video production, the other involving drawing. 
 
Video Critical 
In this study, published as the book Video Critical: Children, the 
Environment and Media Power (Gauntlett, 1997), the researcher worked 
with seven groups of children aged 7–11 to make videos about ‹the 
environment›. The participants were from Leeds, UK, and attended mostly 
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inner-city schools characterised by a diverse ethnic mix and relatively poor 
socio-economic backgrounds. 
The study grew out of a need to assess the impact of the environmental 
messages which had been appearing in a range of media consumed by 
children in the early to mid 1990s. Having established that traditional 
‹effects› research was unable to offer valuable models for assessing the 
influence of the media (Gauntlett, 1995, 2001), this study sought to take a 
distinctly different – or even ‹opposite› – approach. Where traditional 
‹effects› research is interested in participants’ responses on a pre-selected 
axis, recorded quantitatively (for example, how many times they hit a doll 
or press a button), the Video Critical research was interested in 
participants’ responses, whatever they may be (for example, the children 
could choose what to put into their film, how to film it, what messages to 
include or narrative to follow). Where ‹effects› research sees children as 
passive receivers of media messages, this research was interested in 
participants as creative and thoughtful individuals. In particular, ‹effects› 
research would not offer young people the opportunity to demonstrate any 
intelligent or critical responses, whereas this research presented participants 
with a platform to demonstrate their abilities. 
The ‹data› for analysis in such a study is not simply the videos that are 
produced, but rather also – perhaps more importantly – includes the 
researcher’s ethnographic observations of the entire production process, 
from first thoughts and discussions, through planning and various filming 
sessions, and responses to material in progress, through to completion. 
The study was able to demonstrate a high level of media literacy in even 
the youngest participants. In their few years of experience as media 
consumers, the children had learned elements of genre and presentation, as 
well as acquiring a lively awareness of the way in which things could be 
represented, and misrepresented, on camera. The children’s familiarity with 
the constructedness of the media, their ability to imagine the final edited 
text even as they recorded elements of it out of sequence, and the sheer 
speed with which they picked up how to operate the equipment and began 
creative activity, all confirmed that an ‹open research method which 
allowed children to express themselves would lead to a much more positive 
picture of young media consumers than the ‹closed›, inherently negative 
methods used by ‹effects› researchers. 
In terms of environmental issues, the study was able to show that the 
children felt quite a high level of concern about environmental issues, 
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particularly pollution and the need for green, open spaces. The children 
related to environmental issues most closely at the local level, although 
some global extrapolations were made. However, the children did not focus 
on global issues primarily in their videos, and the published study 
(Gauntlett, 1997) discusses the idea that the absence of a global or ‹macro› 
focus in the environmental media coverage consumed by children led to 
their understanding of the whole issue being ‹bent› towards the 
individualistic, local level.  
The time spent observing the planning and production of each video, over a 
period of weeks, revealed that the impressions generated in the group 
interview in the first week of the study (equivalent to the focus group 
which is often the only information-gathering element of other qualitative 
studies) were often inaccurate, with some being distinctly misleading. 
Children who had seemed indifferent to the environment in conversation 
were found to have quite strong views on some issues – particularly where 
related to the quality of their own lives – whilst others who had emerged 
from the initial discussion as keen environmentalists were found to be 
rather less committed where significant amounts of actual effort would be 
required. Over time, it generally became clear that the children were more 
familiar with environmentalist values and discourses than had been initially 
apparent; but also that environmental concern was not singular or 
straightforward, as conflicts were observed between the idealistic desire to 
be environmentally friendly on the one hand, and the more pragmatic or 
hedonistic pull of enjoying themselves and ‹not bothering› on the other. By 
the end of each project, one could see that the initial group interviews had 
represented a kind of ‹brain dump› of potential interests and concerns, 
which in subsequent weeks were sifted and filtered to reveal the more 
genuinely-felt opinions.  
The video-making process gave children a voice, not only to provide 
considered answers, but to set their own questions. They were even able to 
use the persuasive vehicles of humour and satire to make their points. Such 
findings contrasted pleasingly with the findings of ‹effects› studies, which 
typically positioned young participants as likely victims of the media, and 
seemed most happy to find any partial evidence which would confirm this 
view. By contrast, this study was able to show that children are far from 
being simply passive or reactive in relation to the mass media. The content 
of television programmes and other media goes through complex processes 
of critical interpretation and integration with existing knowledge and 
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understandings, and so cannot have direct or predictable ‹effects› on 
attitudes or behaviour. Children are generally sharp and cynical readers of 
the mass media – as they are able to demonstrate when given the oppor-
tunity to be writers of such media. (For more about this study, see online 
presentation with photographs at www.artlab.org.uk/videocritical). 
 
Drawing Celebrity 
This study, conducted 2003–04, explored the idea of asking participants to 
do drawings as the way of getting into participants’ responses to media 
material. The research sought to explore how young people think about 
celebrities, and whether ‹celebrity culture› (seen as being especially 
dominant at this time in the UK) was having an impact on their aspirations 
or lifestyle values. The work also considers changing perceptions of gender 
identities. 
The study involved 100 ‹Year 10› students (aged 14–15) in the south of 
England. Participants were asked: «Draw a star, celebrity or famous person 
who you would like to be. If there’s nobody you’d like to be, at all, then 
choose someone who you think is good or cool». They were also asked to 
«put them in a particular setting and/or doing something», and were 
reassured that their drawing skills were of no concern. 
See fig. 1 for examples of some of the images. Clearly, it would be difficult 
to interpret such pictures in isolation – and indeed, as discussed above, I do 
not feel that one can justify a researcher imposing their, or any other, 
‹external› interpretation (since we could never agree why one interpretation 
was correct and another one was not), and therefore the solution has to be 
that the artist interprets their work themselves. 
Therefore, after spending 30–40 minutes on the drawing, participants were 
then asked to complete a single-sheet questionnaire, the most important 
part of which was the open question «Do you think it would be good to be 
like this person … and if so, why?». (It would have been better to conduct 
interviews, so that aspects of each drawing, and specific points expressed in 
answers, could be explored; but time constraints – in terms of how much 
disruption school teachers would allow – meant that a written response was 
often the only practical solution). Answers to this question included, for 
example: 
• Female who had drawn actress Julia Roberts: «Yes, because she’s rich, 
famous, pretty and is a fantastic actress. I like all the film’s she’s in. She 
deals well when the public criticises her. She’s really talented and  
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secure».  
• Male who had drawn rugby star Johnny Wilkinson: «Yes because he’s 
 the best in the world. He has lots and lots of money. He plays rugby 
(better than football)». 
• Female who had drawn pop star and actress J-Lo: «Have lots of money». 
Very famous. Can have anything she wants. Loved by lots of people. 
• Male who had drawn singer Bob Marley: «Yes, because he was out of 
this world (if you get what I mean). He wrote a lot of good songs, had a 
lot of wives and solved a lot of political problems in Jamaica». 
 
In a relatively small number of cases (16 per cent) the artists had decided 
that they did not actually want to be that person after all, or had mixed 
feelings. For example: 
• Male who had drawn football star David Beckham: «No, because even 
though he is really rich and famous, he’s always in the papers. I wouldn’t 
be able to cope with all the media coverage he gets. It would be good to 
play for Real Madrid and be that rich but not so famous». 
• Female who had drawn Friends actress Jennifer Aniston: «Maybe. 
Because it would be nice to be married to Brad Pitt. Being famous would 
be nice but maybe a bit annoying. She is very attractive». 
• Male who had drawn singer-songwriter Badly Drawn Boy: «Some parts 
would be good, like having lots of money and having singing talent. 
Also having the lazy lifestyle would be good. But the fans and fame I 
would not appreciate». 
 
A second question, «What setting did you draw them in, and what are they 
doing in your drawing? And why do you think you drew them like this?» 
usually only elicited descriptive responses, although occasionally they were 
a little more revealing. For example: 
• Female who had drawn pop star Christina Aguilera: «I drew her singing 
at the Europe Music Awards. I drew her in this setting as I would love to 
sing live in a stadium in front of all those people and have them all love 
you». 
• Male who had drawn Virgin entrepreneur Richard Branson: «Richard is 
posing in front of his planes, trains and his shops and phone services. I 
drew him like this because it shows what a good business man he is». 
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• Female who had drawn Friends actress Jennifer Aniston: «She is shop-
ping and is by her big house. I drew her like this because she is able to 
go shopping and spend a lot of money and can spend her money without 
wondering if they can actually afford to spend that amount of money. 
Arguably the most interesting written responses were given in response to a 
third, more ‹closed› question, which said: «Can you think of three words 
which might be used to describe this person, and which also describe how 
you would like people to think of you?». Although apparently offering less 
scope for rich qualitative responses, this question drew consistently 
interesting, thoughtful answers. David Beckham, for example, was 
described by one young man as ‹happy›, ‹a family man› and having ‹lots of 
friends›. This choice of three phrases interestingly leaves out football skills, 
and positions Beckham as a father and family man. Other responses from 
males included: 
• Bob Marley — Sound; Funny; Warm 
• Roger from Less Than Jake — Cool; Modest; Friendly 
• Orlando Bloom — Talented; Cool; Good looking 
• Matthew Perry — Funny; Original, unique; Interesting 
• Bruce Lee — Focused; Mellow; Supple  
 
Coming from male teenagers, responses such as these – which are 
emotionally reflective rather than ‹macho› – suggest either that young 
masculinities are changing (Frosh, Phoenix & Pattman, 2001; Gauntlett, 
2002), or that the drawing process gives research participants time to 
develop more nuanced thoughts about the subject-matter. (In fact, I believe 
both of these to be the case). Studies of gendered self-presentation have 
found that the school context still typically requires young males to create a 
performance of masculinity within very particular boundaries. In terms of 
media research specifically, David Buckingham (1993) discusses how his 
efforts to discuss television with groups of boys aged between seven and 
twelve, in English schools, encountered serious difficulties because 
masculinity was actively ‹policed› by the boys themselves. Although they 
were able to have relatively complex discussions about sexism in cartoons, 
the boys kept each others’ masculinities in check, so that any boy who 
began to step out of line – by expressing a more ‹feminine› view, or even 
by suggesting that they liked a female character – would quickly be 
‹corrected› or made fun of, so that their self-presentation was hastily 
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pushed back into the more traditional masculine mode. 
The drawing exercise does not necessarily get around this problem – 
indeed, drawing may be a more self-conscious activity than speech – but it 
seems that once young males have decided to participate in the activity, 
they are then perhaps a little more willing to engage seriously with 
associated issues. Rather than being a study which leads to confident 
assertions of findings, this study was useful in developing ideas about the 
use of drawings in research – some of which are discussed a little more in 
‹A few more thoughts›, below. 
 
Other studies 
Further projects which have made use of this approach include: 
– Designs on Masculinity – PhD project by Ross Horsley (2001–04), in 
which young men aged 16–30 (some in school or college, some working 
men, some in prison) are asked to design a men’s magazine «which you 
would like to read, but which you also think would appeal to men in 
general». Horsley’s findings suggest an equation between the process of 
constructing a magazine and the process of constructing one’s own 
gender identity. Some information at www.artlab.org.uk, and see the 
developing website at www.readinginto.com/magazines. 
– The Passport of Me – Art and identity project in collaboration with Peter 
Bonnell at Royal College of Art (2004). Young people were given a 
blank passport, art materials and polaroid camera, and asked to create a 
document recording aspects of themselves (tying in with the exhibition 
about documentation, This Much is Certain). See ‹www.artlab.org.uk/ 
passport.htm›. 
 
Some other recent studies and activities are mentioned in «Popular Media 
and Self-Identity: New approaches» at www.artlab.org.uk/inaugural.htm 
and a few earlier ones appear at www.artlab.org.uk/projects.htm. 
 
A few more thoughts on visual methodologies 
Following on from my most recent research experience – the study outlined 
above in which teenagers were asked to do drawings of celebrities – I 
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Avoiding linearity 
A valuable aspect of static imagery, used in research – such as drawings or 
collages, for example, but not video in this instance – is its lack of linearity. 
When we seek verbal or written responses from research participants, that 
data has to necessarily be sorted into an order. As Rudolph Arnheim notes 
in Visual Thinking (1969): 
Intellectual thinking [as expressed in language, and as opposed to 
visual thinking] strings perceptual concepts in linear succession… 
Intellectual thinking dismantles the simultaneity of spatial structure. It 
also transforms all linear relations into one-directional successions – 
the sort of event we represent by an arrow (p. 246). 
When visualising a concept or a problem, we might picture a number of 
things at once, and perhaps see them as interconnected, but language forces 
us to put these into an order, one first and then the others, with the former 
often seeming to act upon or influence the latter. As Arnheim put it later, in 
his New Essays on the Psychology of Art (1986):  
Propositional language, which consists of linear chains of 
standardized units, has come about as a product of the intellect; but 
while language suits the needs of the intellect perfectly, it has a 
desperate time dealing with field processes, with images, with 
physical and social constellations, with the weather or a human 
personality, with works of art, poetry, and music (p. 20–21). 
Pictures obviously offer us the opportunity to reveal «everything in one 
go», without the material being forced into an order or a hierarchy. Often it 
is useful to have some explanation in words, after the initial (and central) 
impact of the imagery; but the primacy of the image can be retained. The 
example of the ‹mind map› of Beethoven’s ninth symphony prepared by 
Benjamin Zander, conductor of the Boston Philharmonic Orchestra, 
illustrates this nicely (see www.artlab.org.uk/inaugural.htm). After much 
research and immersion in the symphony and the world of its composer, 
Zander created his visual guide to the piece, which is then presented to the 
orchestra. Although some of the meaning of this mind map will be 
translated into language, as the orchestra discusses it with Zander, the 
visualisation itself remains the primary reference point. Similarly, when a 
research participant creates a static artwork, their work offers a 
simultaneous range of themes and interpretations which may be explored. 
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Pictures as propositions, and as reflections of mental concepts 
Nicholas Mirzoeff, whilst defining visual culture, notes that «visual culture 
does not depend on pictures themselves but the modern tendency to picture 
or visualize existence» (1999: 5). If modern living is primarily an 
experience of the visual, then getting this imagery ‹from› the mind, and 
‹into› the realm of analysable research material would be a central goal for 
researchers. Art and drawing would seem to be the most direct way to do 
this. Of course, it is not direct at all: individuals have different levels of 
artistic skill, and on top of that, have different levels of confidence – or 
more usually lack of confidence – in those skills. Furthermore, as Gertraud 
Diem-Wille reminds us, in psychoanalytic terms, artworks will always be 
‹compromise formations› – ‹compromises between the instinctual wish and 
all forces that oppose instinctual gratification» (2001: 120). In other words, 
even when artworks are intended to be expressive of something particular, 
they are always compromises between a revelation of something, and the 
social and psychological forces that prevent the artist from simply showing 
it. 
Even the idea of putting a mental ‹picture› onto paper is far from 
straightforward, since the image we have of something in the mind is not 
usually fully-formed, like a photograph, but is more likely to be fractured 
and impressionistic. Virginia Woolf described consciousness in this way: 
Examine for a moment an ordinary mind on an ordinary day. The 
mind receives a myriad impressions – trivial, fantastic, evanescent, or 
engraved with the sharpness of steel. From all sides they come, an 
incessant shower of innumerable atoms … ([1919] 2003: 69). 
This continuous ‹shower› of new material could be said to run down the 
valleys of the brain and enter the ‹stream› described by psychiatrist 
Anthony Storr: 
Although we may describe what goes on in our own minds as 
continuous, the ‹stream of consciousness›, we cannot actually perceive 
this. It is more like a stream of unconsciousness, with elements we call 
conscious floating like occasional twigs on the surface of the stream. 
When something occurs to us, a new thought, a linking of perceptions, 
an idea, we take pains to isolate it, to make it actual by putting it into 
words, writing it down, stopping the ‹flow› of mental activity for the 
time being as we might reach out and grab one of the twigs floating 
past. (1992: 169). 
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When not translated into words, elements in the stream may be revealed to 
us as what Arnheim (1969: 108), after Titchener (1926: 13), calls ‹visual 
hints« and ‹flashes’›. Philosopher Susanne Langer (1942) notes that certain 
perceived images may be deliberately stored, in a way parallel to Storr’s 
grabbing of twigs, in a process where the raw perceived moving image data 
is ‹projected› … into a new dimension, the more or less stable form we call 
a picture’ which has «a unity and lasting identity that makes it an object of 
the mind’s possession rather than sensation» (p. 66). Nevertheless, of 
course these mentally stored perceptions are not the kind of recollection 
which might easily be mistaken for ‹actual› perception; rather, Langer says 
they «have all the characteristics of symbols», and therefore that we «attend 
to them only in their capacity of meaning things» since they are «symbols 
whereby those things are conceived, remembered, considered» (ibid). 
Langer, who felt that language is «a poor medium for expressing our 
emotional nature» (p. 100), sought to systematise the interpretation of 
symbols, with a debateable degree of success; but here we can simply take 
the point that humans store particular symbolic images – or at least, visual 
notes – for particular meaningful reasons. Turning this visual concept (in 
the mind) into a simple two-dimensional drawn image (in the physical 
world), is not likely to be simple. 
Nevertheless, a person typically makes an effort and is able to put down 
something; something we can look at and consider. Here another point 
made by Arnheim seems provocative: 
Every picture is a statement. The picture does not present the object 
itself but a set of propositions about the object; or, if you prefer, it 
presents the object as a set of propositions (1969: 308). 
If we apply this to the example of the celebrity-drawing study outlined 
above, it would suggest that we could examine each artwork as being a set 
of propositions about that admired celebrity. To avoid imposing a reading, 
once again, this would need to be explored as part of a dialogue with the 
artist; the researcher could ask the participant to suggest what these 
propositions might be, and could offer some for discussion, ultimately 
perhaps agreeing on a list of such statements.  
 
Further possibilities 
Instead of asking participants to produce just one image, it may be more 
fruitful to ask them to produce as many as they like – partly so that a 
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thought can be refined and presented in different ways, and partly because 
we often have a range of thoughts about any particular topic4. This would 
also mean that the participant could talk the researcher through each image 
and construct an account, or a narrative, of the connections and differences 
between the different images in the overall set. 
Furthermore, future developments of this kind of work might allow 
participants more choice and variety in the ways in which they are enabled 
to express themselves. Instead of the researcher saying «Here’s the video 
camera», or «Here’s the pens», participants could be allowed to select their 
own forms as well as styles. 
 
Conclusion 
As was outlined at the start of this paper, this approach, in which 
participants are asked to provide a visual, creative response to a certain 
question or issue in media studies: 
– Is different to most methods in audience/social research, which require 
participants to produce instant descriptions of their views, opinions or 
responses, in language; 
– Is a different way into a research question: inviting participants to create 
things as part of the research process; 
– Operates on the visual plane, to a substantial degree (as does most media 
and popular culture); 
– Involves a reflective process, taking time; 
– Recognises the creativity of ‹audiences›, and engages the brain in a 
different way; 
– Generally avoids treating individuals as mere ‹audience› of particular 
products. 
                                         
4  The idea that we might need more than one image comes, once again, from Rudolph 
Arnheim: ‹I mentioned earlier that drawings, paintings, and other similar devices 
serve not simply to translate finished thoughts into visible models but are also an aid 
in the process of working out solutions of problems. Of this, one receives little 
evidence from studies that yield only one drawing for each task. Therefore, in the 
experiments of Miss Caplan [a student of Arnheim who had asked fellow students to 
do drawings of concepts], subjects were encouraged to «use as many pieces of paper 
as you need: a new piece for each new idea; a new piece each time you want to 
correct an old idea. Continue until you are satisfied with your drawing! Think aloud 
as you draw and explain what you are doing as you do it!» Eleven subjects produced 
an average of nine drawings each; one drew as many as thirteen, and nobody settled 
for fewer than six›. (1969: 129-130). 
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This approach – to make one further point – seems to usefully bridge the 
divide between ‹theory› and ‹practice› in media studies. At both school and 
university level, media and communications studies is often taught as a 
subject of two halves – the ‹practical› work (making media) on the one 
hand, and the ‹theory› work (studying media) on the other. This dichotomy 
is often a source of frustration for both students and teachers, and 
unhelpfully carves up the field. The approach to media studies discussed in 
this paper fuses the two together – studying media by making media; or, to 
be more specific, studying media and its place in the everyday world 
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